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major questions: (a) how do young children perform in eyewitness 
studies, (b) why are some children less accurate than others, and 
(c) what phenomena generate unreliable testimony?  Throughout 
our research, our focus is on factors other than lying that produce 
inaccurate or seemingly inconsistent autobiographical reports. 
Collectively, this research has shown that (a) children’s 
eyewitness accuracy is highly dependent on context, (b) 
neurological immaturity makes children vulnerable to errors under 
some circumstances, and (c) some children are more swayed by 
external influences than others.  Finally, the diversity of factors 
that can influence the reliability of children’s testimony dictates 
that (d) analyzing children’s testimony as if they were adults (i.e., 
with adult abilities, sensibilities, and motivations) will lead to 
frequent misunderstandings.  It takes considerable knowledge of 
development—including information about developmental 
psycholinguistics, memory development, and the gradual 
emergence of cognitive control—to work with child witnesses and to 
analyze cases as there are many sources of unreliable testimony. 
I. SOURCES OF UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY FROM CHILDREN 
Interest in the reliability of children’s testimony increased 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, when exposés of high-profile 
day care abuse cases chronicled allegations that were unlikely 
and, sometimes, clearly impossible.1  Two opinions developed 
among professionals:  that something must have happened in 
these cases and that allegations could arise in the absence of 
abuse.  To explore these possibilities, researchers reproduced 
various case features in field and laboratory settings and observed 
what happened.2  Collectively, they studied how numerous factors 
 1.  See Douglas Linder, The McMartin Preschool Abuse Trial: A 
Commentary, FAMOUS TRIALS (2003), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty 
/projects/ftrials/mcmartin/mcmartinaccount.html; see also Nadja Schreiber et 
al., Suggestive Interviewing in the McMartin Preschool and Kelly Michaels 
Daycare Abuse Cases: A Case Study, 1 SOC. INFLUENCE 16, 19 (2006) 
(analyzing interviews from the two cases). 
 2.  See generally Maggie Bruck & Laura Melnyk, Individual Differences 
in Children’s Suggestibility: A Review and Synthesis, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 947 (2004); Debra Ann Poole, Sonja P. Brubacher & Jason J. 
Dickinson, Children as Witnesses, in APA HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC 
PSYCHOLOGY (Brian L. Cutler & Patricia A. Zapf eds., 2d ed. forthcoming); 
Gabrielle Principe et al., Children as Witnesses, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
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influence children’s event reports, including the information 
encountered in daily life, the characteristics of target events and 
the interviews that follow, and the individual differences that lead 
to strikingly diverse testimonies even among children of the same 
age.3 
 Today, the biggest impediment to understanding children’s 
testimony is a widespread tendency to reduce the complex findings 
from these studies into absolutes.  For example, the belief that 
“children do not lie about sexual abuse”4 exists alongside the idea 
that eyewitness research “created a backlash that called into 
question the general reliability of all child testimony,”5 and 
conference attendees frequently refer to two “sides” or “camps” 
regarding children’s testimonial abilities.  This either-or way of 
thinking is confusing to eyewitness researchers, partly because 
most investigators are uninterested in lying (they study other 
mechanisms underlying false reports), but also because children’s 
behavior is too variable to be accurately captured by such firm 
resolutions.6 
Our goal is to provide a more productive starting point for 
case analyses and policy efforts by distilling research findings on 
sources of unreliable testimony into four principles that capture 
how the field of forensic developmental psychology conceptualizes 
this topic.7  The studies we selected to illustrate these principles 
APPLIED MEMORY (D.S. Lindsay & T. Perfect eds., forthcoming Dec. 2013) 
[hereinafter Principe et al., 2013]. 
 3.  See, e.g., Bruck & Melnyk, supra note 2, at 986–87; Poole, Brubacher 
& Dickinson, supra note 2; Principe et al. 2013 supra note 2.    
 4.  See, e.g., Do Children Lie Abuse Sexual Abuse?, RAPE AND ABUSE 
CRISIS CENTER (July 2012), https://www.raccfm.com/iles/do%20children%20 
lie%20about%20sexual%20abuse.pdf; Child Sexual Abuse, AM. HUMANE 
ASS’N, http://www.americanhumane.org/children/stop-child-abuse/fact-sheets/ 
child-sexual-abuse.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
 5.  Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual 
Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 
WIDENER L. REV. 239, 242 (2010). 
 6.  Livia L. Gilstrap, Kristina Fritz, Amanda Torres & Annika Melinder, 
Child Witnesses: Common Ground and Controversies in the Scientific 
Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59, 79 (2005).  
 7.  See Maggie Bruck & Debra A. Poole, Introduction to the Special Issue 
on Forensic Developmental Psychology, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 331, 331 
(2002) (introducing the term forensic developmental psychology to capture 
the growing body of developmental studies that are grounded in basic 
research yet designed to investigate psychological processes that have legal 
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address three major questions:  (a) how do young children perform 
in eyewitness studies, (b) why are some children less accurate 
than others, and (c) what phenomena generate unreliable 
testimony?  Throughout, our focus is on factors other than lying 
that produce inaccurate or seemingly inconsistent 
autobiographical reports. 
II. PATTERNS OF PERFORMANCE IN CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 
Results from three studies illustrate the tremendous 
variability that is typical of children’s eyewitness performance 
across different situations.8  In the first, research assistants, 
called “Mr. Science,” led three- to eight-year-olds through a set of 
fun science demonstrations, their parents later read them a book 
that described some things that had happened in the laboratory 
along with some fictitious events,9 and interviewers asked the 
children to describe the Mr. Science experience before delivering 
yes-no questions about the experienced and fictitious events 
(including questions about whether Mr. Science had put 
something yucky in their mouths or had pushed their tummies).10  
Table 1 reports the percentage of questions about touching that 
elicited false reports from children who had not been touched by 
Mr. Science and had not heard anything about touching from the 
book (left column).11  Notice that these children rarely said “yes” 
to yes-no questions about nonexperienced touching, which mirrors 
the low error rates obtained when interviewers ask about 
implications). 
 8.  Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness 
Reports after Exposure to Misinformation from Parents, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 27, 49 (2001) [hereinafter Poole & Lindsay 2001]; 
Gabrielle F. Principe et al., Children’s Natural Conversations Following 
Exposure to a Rumor: Linkages to Later False Reports, 113 J. OF 
EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 383, 395 (2012) [hereinafter Principe et al. 
2012]; Debra Ann Poole et al., Deficient Cognitive Control Fuels Children’s 
Exuberant False Allegations, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 101,108 
(2014) [hereinafter Poole et al. 2014]. 
 9.  Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 29.  There were actually two 
demonstrations sets and numerous forms of the book so that each science 
demonstration appeared in each condition across children (experienced, 
experienced and mentioned in the book, only suggested by the book, or not 
experienced and not suggested).  Id. at 30. 
 10.  Id. at 30. 
 11.  Id. at 36. 
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nonexperienced touching to the genitals and anus after pediatric 
examinations.12 
 
Table 1 
Percentage of Yes-No Questions About Non Experienced      
Touching That Elicited False “Yes” Responses in Poole & 
Lindsay (2001, Session 2) 
                           Condition 
 
                 Story parents read did not        Story parents read 
 Ages (years)        describe touching               described touching 
3                                      0%                                     37% 
4                                    16%                                     42% 
5                                      0%                                     38%  
6                                      0%                                     33%    
7                                      0%                                     33% 
8                                      0%                                     36% 
 
But we cannot form an accurate picture of children’s 
testimony from this data alone.  The right column of Table 1 
reports how children performed when their stories had mentioned 
nonexperienced touching: now they falsely reported touching 
roughly a third of the time, and many went on to provide 
narrative accounts of these events.13  Interestingly, some of the 
older children who made false reports actually knew they had not 
been touched but failed to clarify this when answering yes-no 
questions (even though the interviewer had instructed them to 
talk only about things that really happened).14  Together with 
results from other studies, we know that it takes special questions 
to clarify the source of information when children parrot 
comments they heard before an interview.15  Confusing something 
that was only mentioned by an adult with something that actually 
 12.  See, e.g., Margaret S. Steward & David S. Steward, Interviewing 
Young Children about Body Touching and Handling, 61 MONOGRAPHS OF THE 
SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 105 (1996). 
 13.  Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 38. 
 14.  Id. at 44. 
 15.  Id. at 46.  See also Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8, at 399; Debra 
Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Reducing Child Witnesses’ False Reports of 
Misinformation from Parents, 81 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 117, 135–
36 (2002) [hereinafter Poole & Lindsay 2002]. 
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happened is a type of “source-monitoring” error, and young 
children are especially prone to these errors.16  Because source 
monitoring is also deficient in some adults with injuries to the 
frontal lobe of the brain, cognitive psychologists believe that 
neurological immaturity contributes to the fact that young 
children are often more influenced by misinformation compared to 
older children and adults.17 
A second study illustrates that the detrimental effect of 
misinformation replicates across different procedures.18  Gabrielle 
Principe and her research team arranged for children (ages three 
to six years old) to watch a magic show that was carried out by an 
assistant called Magic Mumfry.19  At the end of the show, Mumfry 
tried, unsuccessfully, to pull a rabbit out of a hat and apologized 
for the failed trick.20 Children in an Overheard condition then 
heard two adults conversing about a loose rabbit in the school 
(which was the target rumor), whereas children in the Classmate 
condition only mingled afterward with these children (while 
digital recorders documented their conversations).21 Finally, 
children in the Control condition did not hear the rumor or 
interact with children who had.22  All children were interviewed 
one week and four weeks after the magic show (with instructions 
to tell interviewers “only about things that you remember 
happening to you—things that you really did or remember seeing 
with your own eyes.”)23 
Table 2 reports findings from the four-week delay for five- and 
six-year-olds.24  As in other studies, few children in the Control 
group, who had not been exposed to the rumor, reported the 
falsehood, and false reports that did occur were in response to 
 16.  KIM P. ROBERTS & MARK BLADES, CHILDREN’S SOURCE MONITORING 
321 (2000).  Source monitoring refers to the ability to make decisions about 
where knowledge or a specific memory originated.  See Marcia K. Johnson et 
al., Source Monitoring, 114 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 3, 3 (1993). 
 17.  Daniel L. Schacter et al., True and False Memories in Children and 
Adults:  A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 
411, 421 (1995). 
 18.  See Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8, at 399. 
 19.  Id. at 386. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 389. 
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specific questions about the rumor.25 The picture was quite 
different, though, for children who had overheard the rumor or 
had interacted with informed peers:  nearly all of these children 
reported the rumor, some volunteered elaborate narratives about 
the fictitious event (e.g., “He bit my foot and I went ‘Ouch, you 
stop that now, bunny,’ and he bit my foot.  He bit my finger too.  I 
tried to feed him halfway, and he bit.”), and a substantial 
percentage of the children’s narratives could be traced directly to 
conversations among peers.26  Replicating results from the Mr. 
Science paradigm, fewer children reported actually seeing the 
activity when interviewers asked about the source of their 
knowledge, but still many did (10% in the Overheard condition 
and 35% in the Classmate condition).27  Other studies using the 
rumor paradigm have confirmed that false information embedded 
in natural conversations with peers has a particularly detrimental 
influence on eyewitness accuracy.28  This is summarized in Table 
2 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25.  Id.  Because other studies also found low error rates during open-
ended interviewing (e.g., “Tell me what happened.”), many authors have 
concluded that the information obtained from these prompts is largely 
accurate.  However, most studies that are the basis for this conclusion did not 
expose children to misinformation before interviews.  Though not found with 
Principe et al.’s (2012) procedures, it is common for misinformation presented 
before interviews to infiltrate children’s freely-recalled narratives, leading 
Ceci and his colleagues to include faith in the accuracy of these narratives as 
one of several myths about children’s eyewitness testimony.  Stephen J. Ceci 
et al., Unwarranted Assumptions about Children’s Testimonial Accuracy, 3 
ANN. REV. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 311, 318 (2007). 
 26.  Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8, at 390, 393. 
 27.  Id. at 390. 
 28.  Gabrielle F. Principe & Erica Schindewolf, Natural Conversations as 
a Source of False Memories in Children: Implications for the Testimony of 
Young Witnesses, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 205, 214 (2012). 
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Table 2 
Percentage of 5- and 6-Year-Olds Who Reported a False Rumor 4 
Weeks After the Event in Principe et al. (2012) 
                           Interview Phase (question type) 
Condition                              Open-ended        Specific       Total 
Overheard                                71%                   24%           95% 
Classmate                                 95%                    5%          100% 
Control                                        0%                  11%            11% 
Note.  Interviewers asked specific questions only to children who 
did not discuss the target rumor during open-ended questioning. 
 
Following publication of early misinformation studies, many 
professionals concluded that children accurately recall personal 
experiences, but can be misled by strong misinformation 
procedures.29  A related claim was that most cases did not involve 
misinformation as it has been delivered in these sorts of studies, 
so suggestibility researchers have exaggerated the risks of errors 
in actual cases.30  Setting aside the issue of how often cases 
include suggestive influences, these conclusions are misleading for 
two reasons:  many misinformation procedures are far from strong 
and, in fact, it does not take any explicit misinformation at all to 
elicit false reports from some children.31 
To illustrate how a specific collection of factors can influence 
testimony, meet a boy we will call Mikey, who, at almost six years 
old, visited Mr. Science to participate in a paradigm called Germ 
Detective!32  Before some hands-on activities about germs (the 
target event), assistants created an atmosphere of concern about 
touching by telling Mikey that there was a new germ rule:  Mr. 
Science was no longer allowed to touch children’s skin because the 
research team did not want to spread the germs that cause colds 
and flu.33  During the subsequent activities, Mr. Science “forgot” 
 29.  Kathleen Coulborn Faller, False Accusations of Child Maltreatment: 
A Contested Issue, 29 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1327, 1328 (2005). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See, e.g., Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 30 (using misleading 
information about touching which was only several seconds of narrative). 
 32.  Jason J. Dickinson & Debra A. Poole, Mr. Science—Germ Detective!: 
A Novel Paradigm for Manipulating Disclosure Histories for Research on 
Children’s Eyewitness Testimony, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
APLS Conference (Mar. 14, 2012). 
 33.  See id. 
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the germ rule two times.  Mikey returned for an interview the 
following week, and later we invited him back for another 
session34 to learn more about why he was prone to errors in the 
face of a technique that sometimes produces thoughtless 
responding.35 
During Mikey’s session, a researcher pointed to places on a 
human body diagram to determine Mikey’s names for certain body 
parts (“What’s this?”).36 The researcher then asked if Mr. Science 
had touched him in any of the places on the diagram when he 
played Germ Detective!, marked the spot Mikey pointed to, and 
said, “Did Mr. Science touch you somewhere else?” until Mikey 
replied “no.”37  With this procedure, Mikey falsely accused Mr. 
Science of twenty-nine distinct touches before the interviewer 
terminated questioning.38  He then accused the researcher of ten 
touches when she asked if she had touched him, and he added 
three more false reports when she asked about touching to specific 
parts on the diagram.39  As in other studies, the children who 
made false reports often described realistic context when asked to 
explain what happened.40  For example, one child told the 
researcher that she “touched me here so you could feel me am I 
burning up or not.”41  Of course, the researcher had just met 
Mikey, after which they walked into a room and sat on opposite 
sides of the table.42  Mikey was one of the “exuberant false 
reporters” in this study—children who made more than three false 
accusations of touching against Mr. Science.43  These children 
ranged in age from four to seven years old, with the majority being 
five years or older.44 
 34.  Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 103. 
 35.  Debra Ann Poole & Maggie Bruck, Divining testimony? The Impact 
of Interviewing Props on Children’s Reports of Touching, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL 
REV. 165, 174 (2012); Debra Ann Poole & Jason J. Dickinson, Evidence 
Supporting Restrictions on Uses of Body Diagrams in Forensic Interviews, 35 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 659, 660 (2011). 
     36.      Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 103. 
 37.   Id. 
 38.   Id. 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Id. 
 41.   Id. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.  Id. 
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The studies reviewed thus far illustrate the wide range of 
performance that is typical of eyewitness studies, from largely 
accurate (when children have not been exposed to misleading 
information or an atmosphere of concern about touching) to highly 
inaccurate.  Furthermore, results cannot be captured by a simple 
conclusion that only the youngest children are suggestible.  While 
it is true that false “yes” responses among children who were not 
exposed to misinformation were limited to younger children in the 
first study, this was not the case when children were exposed to 
misinformation: now older children reported nearly as many false 
reports as the younger children did (until the interviewer 
delivered instructions asking them to distinguish between 
experienced and suggested events, in which case the older 
children were more, though not completely, accurate).45  It is also 
possible to construct situations in which younger children report 
more accurately than older children (which psychologists call 
reverse age trends or developmental reversals).46  This tends to 
happen when older children have knowledge about certain types of 
events that conflicts with what happened or that leads them to 
think about related information (whereas younger children do not 
have such knowledge) so that highly associated but 
nonexperienced details infiltrate older children’s reports.  These 
findings bring us to the first principle of children’s testimony: 
Principle #1. Eyewitness errors result from the 
architecture of children’s brains interacting with specific 
contexts and tasks.  Young children are often less reliable 
witnesses than older children and adults, but age trends 
are flat or even reversed in some circumstances. 
Child witness experts always think in terms of Brain + 
Context.  On the Brain side, we have children’s ages and 
information about abilities and conditions associated with 
performance during memory interviews.  On the Context side, we 
have evidence of adult influence, the types of questions 
interviewers ask, and other environmental factors that influence 
accuracy.  Cases with no evidence of adult influence are analyzed 
 45.  Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 36. 
 46.  C.J. Brainerd & V.F. Reyna, Reliability of Children’s Testimony in 
The Era of Developmental Reversals, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL REV., 224, 237 
(2012). 
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differently than cases with significant adult influence or cases 
with investigative techniques that are incompatible with 
children’s brains. 
 
III. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN’S EYEWITNESS 
PERFORMANCE 
Although all children in the Classmate condition in Table 2 
came to report an event that never happened, it is more typical for 
some children to cave to suggestive influences while others do not.  
What are the characteristics of inaccurate children? 
To investigate this question, we gave a battery of 
developmental tasks to Mikey and some other children who had 
participated in the Germ Detective! paradigm.47  Highly 
inaccurate children were different from accurate children in the 
following ways. 
  Inaccurate children were very hands-on:  they continued to 
reach out and use objects even after they had just repeated a “no 
touching” rule delivered by the interviewer.  (We used instructions 
from Bresnard48 but substituted child-appropriate objects).  
Unlike more accurate children, these children could not use a rule 
to guide their behavior even for short periods of time.49 
  Inaccurate children found it hard to inhibit a prepotent 
response: they performed poorly when asked to tap once when the 
researcher tapped twice but twice when the researcher tapped 
once.50 Yet, on an alternate response conflict task in which 
working memory demands were lessened because the stimuli 
(pictures) remained in view,51 accurate and inaccurate children 
 47.  Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 101. 
 48.  See generally J. Bresnard, P. Allain, G. Aubin, V. Chauviré, F. 
Etcharry-Bouyx & D. Le Gall, A Contribution to the Study of Environmental 
Dependency Phenomena: The Social Hypothesis, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 3279–
3294 (2011); Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 104. 
 49.  Poole et al. et al 2014, supra note 8, at 105–07. 
 50.  See generally Adele Diamond & Colleen Taylor, Development of an 
Aspect of Executive Control: Development of the Abilities to Remember What I 
Said and to “Do As I Say, Not as I Do,” 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 
315 (1996). 
 51.  See generally Cherie L. Gerstadt, Yoon Joo Hong & Adele Diamond, 
The Relationship Between Cognition and Action: Performance of Children 3 
1/2–7 Years Old on a Stroop-Like Day-Night Test, 53 COGNITION 129 (1994). 
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performed similarly.52 
  Inaccurate children could not report what someone else 
was thinking when that information differed from what they 
knew.53  For example, they watched assistants enact a story with 
dolls in which a girl saw a ball go into a beach bag, after which her 
playmate moved it to a box without her knowledge.54  When the 
doll returned and the assistant asked “Where will she look?”, 
many of the children who were inaccurate about the Germ 
Detective! event said, “The box” (i.e., where they knew it was).55 
These results demonstrate that children like Mikey have 
difficulty using thoughts to guide their behavior.56  Broadly 
speaking, they do poorly on tests of executive function/cognitive 
control, which are the “processes associated with the control of 
thought and action.”57  During development, cognitive control 
improves as individual brain regions mature and become 
organized into increasingly specialized circuits.58 Children who 
have good cognitive control can attend to information in the 
environment that is relevant to the current situation and filter out 
what is not, attend to memories that are related to the topic of 
conversation and filter out memories from other experiences 
(reality filtering), store information in working memory and work 
with it (such as the questions interviewers ask), maintain 
contextual information that distinguishes relevant 
thoughts/actions from irrelevant thoughts/actions (task-set 
 52.  See Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 105.  
 53.  See id. at 105–07.  
 54.  See Alison Gopnik & Janet W. Astington, Children's Understanding 
of Representational Change and its Relation to The Understanding of False 
Belief and The Appearance-Reality Distinction, 59 CHILD DEV. 26, 27 (1988); 
Heinz Wimmer & Josef Perner, Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and 
Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding 
of Deception, 13 COGNITION 103, 108 (1983). 
 55.  See Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 104. 
 56.  See generally Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8. 
 57.  Silvia A. Bunge & Eveline A. Crone, Neural correlates of the 
development of cognitive control, in NEUROIMAGING IN DEVELOPMENTAL 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 22 (Judith M. Rumsey & Monique Ernst eds., 2009). 
 58.  Beatriz Luna, Aarthi Padmanabhan & Kristen O’Hearn, What has 
fMRI Told us About the Development of Cognitive Control through 
Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN AND COGNITION 101, 112 (2010); Beatriz Luna & John 
A. Sweeney, The Emergence of Collaborative Brain Function: fMRI Studies of 
The Development of Response Inhibition, 1021 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF 
SCI. 296, 300 (2004).  
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representation), switch goals as tasks switch (task-switching; e.g., 
when the topic changes, shift to talk about that topic), and inhibit 
inappropriate responses.59 
Although all children struggle with these things some of the 
time, a subset of children have more difficulty: compared to their 
peers, these children have poor cognitive control.60  In our study, 
performance on three of the developmental tasks correctly 
categorized 90% of the children as either exuberant false reporters 
or typical children, and the common variance among tasks 
predicted the number of false reports.61  This leads to the next two 
principles of children’s testimony: 
Principle #2.  The architecture of children’s brains is 
different from the architecture of adults’ brains, and 
these differences produce differences in executive 
processing/cognitive control that can influence eyewitness 
performance. 
Principle #3. Even within a specific age, children vary 
widely in the extent to which they stay on topic, keep 
rules in mind, and gate out irrelevant thoughts and 
actions.  Although many children are reluctant to disclose 
experienced touching, a subset of children readily disclose 
nonexperienced touching.  Understanding the dynamics 
of the first situation does not help us understand the 
dynamics of the second situation. 
Maggie Bruck recently said that people “should be able to 
keep two thoughts in mind at once.”62  Keeping two thoughts in 
mind means realizing that children can be very accurate and very 
inaccurate, and you need to understand both sides of this issue to 
analyze children’s testimony.  But keeping two thoughts in mind 
is more than just knowing that a specific child can be accurate in 
 59.  Bunge & Crone, supra note 57.  
 60.  See generally Inge-Marie Eigsti et al., Predicting Cognitive Control 
From Preschool to Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
478 (2006). 
 61.  Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8. 
 62.  Personal Communication with Maggie Bruck (Mar. 10, 2013).  In The 
Crack-Up, F. Scott Fitzgerald voiced the same sentiment when he said that 
“the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in 
the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.”  F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up, ESQUIRE (1936). 
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one situation and inaccurate in another:  it also means recognizing 
the important individual differences among children.  Therefore, 
there is variability in the architecture of the brains that come to 
eyewitness tasks as well as variability in children’s contexts (their 
experiences before and during eyewitness interviews).  The 
numerous ways that children’s developmental levels and 
experiences combine to produce unreliable testimony, which we 
turn to next, provide the background for our last principle of 
children’s testimony. 
IV.  MECHANISMS UNDERLYING UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY 
In a study we described earlier, Mr. Science started each 
session by setting a red tomato-shaped kitchen timer while 
explaining that this was how much time they had to play.63  
Remarkably, a dozen children later told interviewers about the 
“potato,” including one child who said, “[t]here was a big clock like 
a potato.”64  Months after a short event, this 3.5-year-old 
demonstrated impressive memory for the object even though it 
was not big, it was not a clock, and it was not a potato.65 
The proliferation of potatoes has a simple explanation: 
children acquire bilabial sounds (such as /m/ and /p/) sooner than 
lingua-alveolar sounds (such as /t/) and avoid words they cannot 
pronounce.66  This example illustrates that testimony—whether 
from an adult or from a child—is rarely entirely accurate or 
entirely inaccurate.67  Instead, numerous factors are associated 
with the reliability of small details and the critical events 
embedded in those details, including memory errors that plague 
all humans and phenomena that are more common among young 
witnesses and those with cognitive impairments.68 
A. Linguistic Confusions 
There is an ever-present threat of misunderstanding children 
 63.  See Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 29. 
 64.  See generally id. 
 65.  See generally id. 
 66.  See, e.g., PETER A. REICH, LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 54–57 (1986); 
Graham Williamson, Speech Sound Development Chart, SLT INFO (June 24, 
2012), http://www.sltinfo.com/speech-sound-development-chart.html. 
 67.  See generally Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8. 
 68.  See generally Poole, Brubacher & Dickinson, supra note 2 
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due to linguistic phenomena involving individual speech sounds, 
words, sentences, and even rules that govern the social uses of 
language.  Errors can appear in case documentation and even 
change children’s testimony (through a process we will describe 
later in which children come to accept adults’ interpretations of 
their testimony).69 
Disarticulations are errors in the production of speech sounds 
that make it difficult to understand children.  In an interviewer 
training one of us attended, for example, an attendee heard a child 
say “He put some paint on my arm” when, actually, the child had 
said, “He put some ting on my arm” (i.e., “He put something on my 
arm”), illustrating a common mistake in which children delete one 
of two consonants that occur together (consonant cluster 
reduction).70  Children also substitute sounds, as a child in one of 
our laboratories did when she repeatedly referred to being given 
“dope.”  The interviewer knew this child was likely referring to the 
hand sanitizer used to clean children’s hands (referred to by many 
of the children as “soap”), but in actual investigative interviews 
pronunciation problems and mumbling can lead to serious errors 
that send investigations off in wrong directions.  For example, we 
have heard interviewers ignore responses they could not 
understand and continue to pursue faulty hypotheses even after 
children had attempted to set conversations on track.71  Younger 
children are also more likely than older children to use ambiguous 
words, which can lead to confusion about the identity of a suspect 
or the number of suspects.72  For example, Battin, Ceci, and Lust 
showed younger (three to five years) and older (six to nine years) 
children a short video of two men and two women who were 
engaged in a task that ended in a misdeed by one of the women.73  
In response to free recall prompts to describe what happened, the 
majority of younger children used incorrect pronouns (e.g., “they”) 
 69.  See discussion infra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 70.  What Kids Can Tell Us: A Critical Assessment of Interview 
Strategies, Training Institute sponsored by Cornell University and The Just 
“For Kids!” Foundation, Inc. (June 4–6, 1996).  
 71.  For a discussion of common pronunciation problems, see ERIKA HOFF, 
LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT (5th ed. forthcoming 2013). 
 72.  David B. Battin et al., Do Children Really Mean What They Say? The 
Forensic Implications of Preschoolers’ Linguistic Referencing, 33 J. APPLIED 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 167, 173 (2012). 
 73.  Id. at 169. 
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or ambiguous articles (e.g., “a . . . ” or “the . . . ”) to describe the 
person who had performed the misdeed, whereas older children 
were more likely to describe events clearly.74  By the end of the 
interview, older children were more likely than younger children 
to have clarified ambiguous descriptions.75 
It also takes time for children to learn the meaning of words 
that seem simple to adults.76  For example, children may deny 
having had clothes on if they were wearing a bathing suit (because 
their definition of clothes does not include a bathing suit) or use 
the word “yesterday” to mean some other time in the past.  The 
need to avoid late-acquired words is one of the biggest challenges 
of interviewing young children, along with the need to word 
questions in simple, direct ways that children understand.77 
Children appreciate the need to take turns and cooperate in 
conversations, but their desire to follow social conventions can 
also mislead adults.  One well-known tendency is their penchant 
for answering questions even when they do not know the 
answers.78  Another strategy they use to keep the conversational 
ball rolling is illustrated by this example from Karen Saywitz: 
 
Attorney:  When you were at your grandma’s house with 
your daddy, whose mamma is your grandma? 
 
Jenny:  Grandma Ann.  (gives grandma’s name) 
 
Attorney:  Is she your daddy’s mamma? 
 
Jenny:  Huh?  (doesn’t understand the question) 
 
Attorney:  Is she your daddy’s mamma?  (leading question    
requiring only a nod) 
 
 74.  Id. at 170. 
 75.  Id. at 171. 
 76.  ANNE GRAFFAM WALKER, HANDBOOK ON QUESTIONING CHILDREN: A 
LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 27–37, 39–44 (2d ed. 1999). 
 77.  See id.  
 78.  See, e.g., Amanda H. Waterman & Mark Blades, The Effect of Delay 
and Individual Differences on Children’s Tendency to Guess, 49 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 215, 215–16 (2013). 
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Jenny:  Daddy’s mamma.  (repeats the end of the sentence;  
common response when communicating with children fails) 
 
Attorney:  Is grandma daddy’s mother?  (requires only a nod  
to force the adult to stop this line of questioning) 
 
Jenny:  She has a boyfriend, two boyfriends.  (irrelevant  
response)79 
 
Here, Jenny is confused about kinship terms but is adept at 
turning conversation back to the attorney by repeating his last 
words (i.e., “Daddy’s mamma” was not necessarily an answer) and, 
finally, by bringing up information only loosely related to the 
topic.80 As Saywitz, Nathanson, and Snyder explained, 
“[c]hildren’s apparent lack of credibility has as much to do with 
the competence of adults to relate to and communicate with 
children as it does with children’s abilities to remember and relate 
their experiences accurately.”81 
These are just a few of the numerous language phenomena 
that cause confusions during investigations.  Because language is 
still developing throughout the elementary school years and well 
into adolescence, psychologists recommend that professionals who 
work with child witnesses follow a set of developmentally-
appropriate guidelines for speaking and consider language issues 
whenever children make remarks that seem inconsistent or 
thoughtless.82 
B. Memory Phenomena 
Memory, which has been described as “open to editing 
anytime it’s pulled up,” is an ever-shifting approximation of 
reality that is prone to errors and inconsistencies.83  In eyewitness 
 79.  Karen J. Saywitz, The Credibility of Child Witnesses, FAM. ADVOC., 
Winter 1988, at 38, 38–39. 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  Karen J. Saywitz, Rebecca Nathanson & Lynn S. Snyder, Credibility 
of Child Witnesses: The Role of Communicative Competence, 13 TOPICS IN 
LANGUAGE DISORDERS 59, 59 (1993). 
 82.  See DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS 
OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 178–80 (1998); see also 
WALKER, supra note 76, at 77–84. 
 83.  Greg Miller, How Are Memories Retrieved?, 338 SCI. 30, 31 (2012). 
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cases, the issue is whether these problems exceed what is typically 
found when people report past events under similar conditions.  
Decisions about whether testimonial content is typical of 
narratives that describe experienced events are based on 
extensive knowledge of how memory works and the nature of 
children’s autobiographical reports,84 including the following 
phenomena.85 
Schema and script-based errors.  Schema (our internal 
representations of the world) and scripts (general representations 
of how things usually happen) give meaning to our experiences 
but can interfere with accurate recollection.  In one study, for 
instance, children watched a slide show about a visit to 
McDonald’s that omitted some central and noncentral details of a 
typical trip.86 When interviewed about the show, they often 
inserted the expected details into responses to specific questions, 
and they did so more often for central details (e.g., paying for the 
food) and after a longer delay.87  In our studies, these errors have 
shown up as a description of a laboratory room that actually 
matched another room in the child’s life, reports that Mr. Science 
demonstrated a well-known science activity (e.g., a volcano) that 
was not part of the demonstration set, and erroneous claims that 
he shook hands at the beginning of the session or patted the child 
on the back.  As memories fade, children increasingly fill in the 
blanks with information from general knowledge about how things 
usually are and how people usually act.88 
Detail errors.  When researchers expose children to events 
without tampering with their memories, and then interview them 
 84.  See generally Carole Peterson, Children’s Long-Term Memory for 
Autobiographical Events, 22 Developmental Rev. 370 (2002); Carole Peterson, 
Children’s Memory Reports Over Time: Getting Both Better and Worse, 109 J. 
of Experimental Child Psychol. 275 (2011); Carole Peterson, Children’s 
Autobiographical Memories Across the Years: Forensic Implications of 
Childhood Amnesia and Eyewitness Memory for Stressful Events, 32 
Developmental Rev. 287 (2012). 
 85.  See Poole, Brubacher & Dickinson, supra note 2.  
 86.  Alicia Erskine, Roslyn Markham & Pauline Howie, Children’s Script-
Based Inferences: Implications for Eyewitness Testimony, 16 COGNITIVE DEV. 
871, 876 (2001). 
 87.  Id. at 882. 
 88.  See Marina Myles-Worsley, Cindy C. Cromer & David H. Dodd, 
Children’s Preschool Script Reconstruction: Reliance of General Knowledge as 
Memory Fades, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 22, 27–28 (1986). 
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days or month later, only a small percentage of the information 
reported in response to open-ended requests to tell what happened 
are detail errors, such as misreporting the color of an item or the 
order of several events.89  Nonetheless, these types of errors do 
occur as children’s minds automatically fill in memory gaps.90  
Although a few detail errors should not cause adults to question 
the gist of the story, numerous details that do not mesh with 
reality (after considering the ways children describe things) 
should be cause for concern. 
Reminiscence.  Children rarely report everything they know 
about an event in a single long narrative; instead, they add new 
information when asked additional questions or when interviewed 
on another occasion.91  Error rates for these new details, though 
typically not as high as for early-reported information, range from 
largely accurate to problematic. One year after an event, for 
example, the information a group of six-year-olds repeated from 
their earlier testimony was accurate 98% of the time, whereas new 
information was accurate only 76% of the time.92  Among children 
interviewed with toy props, which can prompt discussion about 
details that were not part of the target event, only 51% of the new 
information was accurate.93 
Misattributions. All age groups are prone to memory 
misattributions:  we remember an event but place it in the wrong 
time or location, have a sense of familiarity about a face at the 
grocery story but falsely recall how we know the person, and 
believe we have novel insights we actually read on the Internet  In 
The Seven Sins of Memory, Daniel Schacter described the “lethal 
recipe for misattribution”: a strong sense of familiarity along with 
an absence of memories for the details that define specific episodes 
of our lives.94 
 89.  Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 32–33. 
 90.  See Myles-Worsley, Cromer & Dodd, supra note 88. 
 91.  David La Rooy, Carmit Katz, Lindsay C. Malloy & Michael E. Lamb, 
Do We Need to Rethink Guidance on Repeated Interviews?, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 373, 386 (2010). 
 92.  Karen Salmon & Margaret-Ellen Pipe, Props and Children’s Event 
Reports: The Impact of a 1-Year Delay, 65 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 
261, 281 (1997). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND 
FORGETS AND REMEMBERS 97 (2001).  
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Accurate memories for individual episodes rely on mental 
processes that bind together the various features that define those 
memories and, later, strategically access them.95  Because these 
processes are not fully developed during childhood, it is easy to 
nudge some children into falsely saying they experienced certain 
events by exposing them to general information about those 
events.96  This can be accomplished by reading children stories 
that describe fictitious events,97 arranging for them to overhear 
adults or other children talking about the events,98 or asking 
misleading questions that convey the desired information.99  
Misinformation does not have to originate from an individual who 
is motivated to propagate it, however.  Giving interviewers false 
ideas about the nature of the event is enough to increase errors 
(by increasing their use of suggestive techniques),100 and rumors 
rapidly spread beyond the children who initially encountered 
them.101 
Sometimes just asking children to provide information they do 
not have can lead them to confuse what really happened with self-
generated information. This can occur when well-meaning 
interviewers encourage children to provide responses because they 
believe that a lack of response signals reluctance rather than 
 95.  Vinaya Raj & Martha Ann Bell, Cognitive Processes Supporting 
Episodic Memory Formation in Childhood: The Role of Source Memory, 
Binding, and Executive Functioning, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 384, 385 
(2010). 
 96.  Id. at 397. 
 97.  See Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 44; Poole & Lindsay 
2002, supra note 15, at 129. 
 98.  See Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8. 
 99.  See, e.g., William S. Cassel, Claudia E. M. Roebers & David F. 
Bjorklund, Developmental Patterns of Eyewitness Responses to Repeated and 
Increasingly Suggestive Questions, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 116, 
130 (1996); Thomas Hünefeldt, Annalisa Lucidi, Augusta Furia & Clelia 
Rossi-Arnaud, Age Differences in the Interrogative Suggestibility of Children’s 
memory: Do Shift Scores Peak Around 5–6 Years of Age?, 45 PERSONALITY AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 521, 524–25 (2008). 
 100.  See Gail S. Goodman, Anupama Sharma, Sherry F. Thomas & Mary 
Golden Considine, Mother Knows Best: Effects of Relationship Status and 
Interviewer Bias on Children’s Memory, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 
195, 225 (1995); Gabrielle F. Principe, Julio DiPuppo & Jessie Gammel, 
Effects of Mothers’ Conversation Style and Receipt of Misinformation on 
Children’s Event Reports, 28 COGNITIVE DEV. 260, 268–70 (2013).    
 101.  Principe & Schindewolf, supra note 28, at 220. 
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ignorance or forgetting.  To investigate the consequences of this 
interviewing behavior, researchers pressed a group of six- and 
nine-year old children to provide information they did not know at 
a first interview.102  Demonstrating that consistent testimony is 
not always accurate, some of them repeated the inaccurate 
information at a second interview, and this effect was more 
pronounced for the older children.103 
Similarly, more explicit instructions to visualize or imagine 
events can etch erroneous information into memory, and this 
process can occur in daily life, during therapy sessions, or through 
inexpert interviewing.  This technique was used in the McMartin 
Preschool case, as illustrated by the following excerpt: 
 
Interviewer:  Can you remember the naked pictures? 
 
Child:  (Shakes head “no”) 
 
Interviewer:  Can’t remember that part? 
Child: (Shakes head “no”) 
 
Interviewer: Why don’t you think about that for a while,  
okay?  Your memory might come back to you.104 
 
Stephen Ceci and his colleagues mimicked this influence by 
repeatedly asking children (three to six years of age) to “make a 
picture . . . in your head” of true and false events they were told 
their parents had reported.105 During the last session, a new 
interviewer said that the other interviewer had made mistakes 
and had “told many children that things happened to them that 
never happened” before asking about the target events.106  
Although the children were highly accurate when reporting true 
 102.  Stacia Stolzenberg & Kathy Pezdek, Interviewing Child Witnesses: 
The Effect of Forced Confabulation on Event Memory, 114 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CHILD PSYCHOL. 77, 80 (2013). 
 103.  Id. at 85. 
 104.  Schreiber et al., supra note 1, at 28. 
 105.  Stephen J. Ceci, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Michelle D. Leichtman & 
Maggie Bruck, The Possible Role of Source Misattributions in the Creation of 
False Beliefs Among Preschoolers, 42 INT’L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
HYPNOSIS 304, 309 (1994). 
 106.  Id. at 310. 
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events, they acquiesced to more than a quarter of the fictitious 
events in the first interview session and to more than 40% in the 
last.107 
Confabulation.  Adults with certain types of brain damage 
invent answers to questions and tell fantastic but false stories 
about their lives.108  Because the information in these 
confabulations is often based on fragments of true memories that 
are pieced together and displaced in time and place, researchers 
believe that damage to certain regions of the brain interferes with 
the ability to suppress memories that become activated but are 
not relevant to the current situation.109 The idea that a filter 
usually blocks task-irrelevant memories from intruding into 
conversations is consistent with the finding that confabulating 
patients produce fewer memory errors when they divide their 
attention between two tasks, presumably because the second task 
reduces the cognitive resources that would otherwise engage 
irrelevant memories.110 
Neurological immaturity is likely responsible for the fact that 
some young children also produce fantastic narratives during 
interviews.111  During the years when potty talk is funny,112 this 
behavior can appear as silly scatological talk or as bizarre stories 
with other themes.113  In one of our laboratories, for example, a 
boy described how an owl flew into the room, and knocked over a 
machin that blew the boy into the wall.  Adults who do not realize 
that children are “mental surfing,”114 may ask inappropriate 
follow-up questions that children sometimes acquiesce to, starting 
a process that expands and entrenches the story. 
False recognition and acquiescence.  People commit false 
 107.  See id. at 315–17 (describing results of false reports under milder 
instructions). 
 108.  See Armin Schnider, Spontaneous Confabulation and the Adaptation 
of Thought to Ongoing Reality, 44 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE, 662, 663 
(2003). 
 109.  See id. at 667–68 (describing reality monitoring). 
 110.  Elisa Ciaramelli et al., Divided attention during retrieval suppresses 
false recognition in confabulation, 45 CORTEX, 141, 141 (2009). 
 111.  See Schacter et al., supra note 17. 
 112.  LOUIS B. AMES & FRANCES L. ILG, YOUR SIX YEAR OLD: LOVING AND 
DEFIANT 71–72 (1979). 
 113.  See generally STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE 
COURTROOM:  A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995).  
 114.  We picked up this wonderful descriptor from Stephen Ceci.   
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recognitions when they believe that novel stimuli were previously 
encountered.  Confabulating adults have higher rates of false 
recognition, and both errors involve misattributing events to 
previous experience, but false recognition and confabulation are 
different phenomena because these types of errors do not always 
occur together.115  In eyewitness tasks, inaccurately saying “yes” 
to a specific question (e.g., “Did he touch you?) is typically called a 
false recognition even though these responses can be memory 
based (when some aspect of the stimulus triggers an unrelated 
memory) or the product of acquiescence (i.e., going along with the 
interviewer without a belief that the event actually occurred).116 
Compared to adults, children are not universally more likely 
to falsely say “yes,” but there are circumstances that elevate error 
rates.117  Line-up tasks are especially problematic, and even 
teenagers frequently select photos from target-absent lineups. In a 
meta-analysis comparing adult and adolescent performance, 
adults selected a photo only about a quarter of the time when the 
perpetrator was not present, whereas children who were twelve 
and thirteen years of age did so over half of the time.118 
C. Deficient Cognitive Control 
Because the brain circuitry underlying cognitive control is 
incomplete during childhood, young children often drift off topic 
during conversations and respond thoughtlessly due to 
deficiencies that persist into later ages among individuals with 
cognitive impairments.119 
Drifting off topic.  Young children have difficulty acting on 
rules and task sets, so they often share information that is 
unrelated to the topic of conversation.120  Consider a study 
 115.  See generally Ciaramelli, supra note 110. 
 116.  See Henry Otgaar et al., The Origin of Children's Implanted False 
Memories: Memory Traces or Compliance? 139 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA, 397, 397 
(2012) (discussing of the role of memory vs. compliance in suggestibility). 
 117.  See generally Schacter et al., supra note 17, at 411. 
 118.  Joanna D. Pozzulo & R.C.L. Lindsay, Identification Accuracy of 
Children Versus Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 549, 557 
(1998). 
 119.  See, e.g., Denise Valenti-Hein, Use of Visual Tools to Report Sexual 
Abuse for Adults with Mental Retardation, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 297, 301 
(2002).  
 120.  Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 27. 
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described earlier in which interviewers elicited free narrative 
accounts of visits to Mr. Science by first asking children to tell 
everything that happened and then following with three 
additional prompts that mentioned the science room.121  For the 
fifth prompt, interviewers simply asked if there was something 
the children had not told that they could tell now.122  Despite the 
fact that interviewers and children had been talking only about 
the Mr. Science experience, many children did not assume that 
the final prompt referred to that topic, as in these examples: 
four-year-old girl:  Ghost, pumpkins, and a spider.  Didn’t 
crawl on me. . .watch, that’s when you drop drop and roll.  
(Child moved to the floor and did a fire protection 
demonstration.)123 
eight-year-old male:  We have two dogs and two cats in 
our family.  We used to have a fish, but it died.124 
Notice that the first child did not make it clear she was 
talking about something other than the topic of conversation.  In 
investigations, this behavior can lead interviewers to link new 
people and actions to their beliefs about target events, with 
subsequent questioning causing children to gradually weave this 
new information into their reports. 
Reacting inappropriately to immediate stimuli.  Partly 
due to working memory limitations, cognitively immature children 
tend to respond to the pull of external stimuli more than other 
children do.125  Behaviors such as off-topic exploring of anatomical 
dolls, repeatedly and inaccurately pointing to body diagrams, and 
answering “yes” or “no” without thought are examples of how 
children sometimes respond inappropriately to what is in front of 
them or what is said.  Among a subset of children, behaviors 
associated with greater dependence on environmental stimuli 
 121.  See id. at 29–31. 
 122.  Id. at 30. 
 123.  See id. at 32. 
 124.  See id. at 46. 
 125.  See generally Joseph S. Raiker et al., Objectively-Measured 
Impulsivity and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Testing 
Competing Predictions from the Working Memory and Behavioral Inhibition 
Models of ADHD, 40 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL., 699, 699 (2012). 
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persist longer in development than is typical.126 
D. Contributing Factors and the Subsequent Cascade 
Eyewitness researchers are interested in how a confluence of 
factors, each of which may not be strongly associated with false 
reports in isolation, can create a snowball of erroneous 
information that grows larger and larger as it races down the 
investigative hill.  For instance, a mother may become concerned 
about abuse after a child makes an ambiguous comment.  Wanting 
to get to the bottom of the matter, she then creates an atmosphere 
of concern by repeated questioning, sometimes distorting what the 
child said and resorting to leading questions.  Most typically-
developing older children would not create false memories of a 
significant event that presumably just occurred, but even older 
children and adults are vulnerable in the face of suggestions about 
long-ago events.127  Because the emergence of credible false 
reports is often a process, experts who create case time-lines 
(summaries of all people, events, and allegations over time) look 
for evidence of the following contributing factors.128 
Honest misunderstandings.  Many abuse investigations 
are triggered by suspicions of abuse rather than children’s reports, 
and children’s behavior provides numerous reasons why adults 
might develop unwarranted suspicions.129  For example, a lack of 
vocabulary and knowledge leads them to report events in 
misleading ways (e.g., saying “Aiden saw his mom and dad have 
sex” when the pair was merely kissing), and their drawings often 
contain innocent yet phallic-looking shapes. 
A situation in one of our laboratories illustrates this process.  
An upset mother called the scheduling manager after her child 
 126.  See, e.g., Megan F. Nicpon, et al., Utilization Behavior in Boys with 
ADHD: A Test of Barkley’s Theory, 26  DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 
735, 747 (2004). 
 127.  See, e.g., Henry Otgaar et al., Abducted by a UFO: Prevalence 
Information Affects Young Children's False Memories for an Implausible 
Event, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 115 (2009) (describing a study 
that elicited reports of alien abduction from 11- and 12-year-olds).   
 128.  See generally MARGARET-ELLEN PIPE ET AL., CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: 
DISCLOSURE, DELAY, AND DENIAL 77 (2007). 
  129.     See generally STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE 
COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995).  
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told her we had played “dirty doctor games.”  She had not 
consented to such things, she explained, apparently not realizing 
that this is how a child might explain our germ-related activities.  
She arrived to watch the session recording with notes she had 
made of the conversation and, after much laughter about what 
had happened, gave permission for us to use this story in reports 
of our findings.  Investigators often clarify misunderstandings by 
asking children to describe events more fully in their own words 
(“from the very beginning to the end”) but, unfortunately, the 
following influences can complicate efforts to discover the truth. 
Negative stereotypes and an atmosphere of accusation.  
Adults who believe that other individuals have certain 
characteristics sometimes make repeated remarks that lead 
children to falsely report behavior consistent with those 
characteristics.  The classic study on this process is the Sam Stone 
study by Leichtman and Ceci.130  For the target event, a stranger 
called Sam Stone briefly visited day care centers, during which 
nothing remarkable happened.131  Children assigned to the 
stereotype condition were visited by a research assistant 
beforehand who described Sam as a clumsy person.132  After Sam’s 
visit, children who had and had not been exposed to the negative 
stereotype were interviewed four times, either neutrally or 
suggestively, followed by a final neutral interview for all 
children.133 
Children who experienced neither the stereotype nor 
suggestive interviews were highly accurate:  on the fifth interview, 
no child in this control group made a false allegation in response 
to open-ended requests to describe what happened,134 few falsely 
acquiesced to more specific prompts about events that had not 
occurred,135 and the children who falsely acquiesced often 
retracted false reports when challenged.136 Exposure to the 
 130.  See Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of 
Stereotypes and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 568, 570–76 (1995). 
 131.  Id. at 570. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 570–71. 
 134.  Id. at 571. 
 135.  Id. at 571, 578 (“I heard something about a book [a teddy bear].  Do 
you know anything about that?”). 
 136.  Id. (“You didn’t really see him do anything to the book [the teddy 
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negative stereotype elevated the number of false reports in 
response to specific prompts, and results were dramatically 
different among children exposed to both forms of influence:  46% 
of the three- and four-year-olds and 30% of the five- and six-year-
olds spontaneously reported suggested misdeeds in their free 
narrative accounts of the visit.137  Videotapes of the children 
captured creative confabulation as they embellished the 
suggestions to build a good story.138  The Sam Stone study showed 
that results from study designs that do not include an atmosphere 
of concern or negative stereotypes cannot be generalized to cases 
in which this is a prominent feature.139 
Interviewer modifications. Expectations about what 
children will say and difficulties understanding them often lead 
interviewers to repeat back statements that do not match the 
original testimonies. For example, Kim Roberts and Michael Lamb 
found 140 instances in which interviewers misinterpreted or 
distorted children’s remarks in only sixty-eight sexual abuse 
interviews.140  Many distortions involved actions and the identity 
of people.141  Most important, children corrected or disagreed with 
these errors only one-third of the time.142  When interviewers 
were not corrected, they continued to refer to the erroneous 
information for the rest of the interview.143 
Jennifer Hunt and Eugene Borgida reproduced this process in 
the laboratory with interviewers who intentionally distorted five 
answers.144  Their participants (three- to five-year-olds, nine- to 
eleven-year-olds, and adults) disagreed only 27% of the time, with 
younger children more often incorporating the distorted 
information into answers to questions delivered later in the 
bear], did you?”). 
 137.  Id. at 572–73. 
 138.  Id. at 573. 
 139.  Id. at 576. 
 140.  Kim P. Roberts & Michael E. Lamb, Children’s responses when 
interviewers distort details during investigative interviews, 4 LEGAL & CRIM. 
PSYCHOL. 23, 25, 27–30 (1999). 
 141.  Id. at 28–30. 
 142.  Id. at 29. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Jennifer S. Hunt & Eugene Borgida, Is That What I Said?:  
Witnesses’ Responses to Interviewer Modifications, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 583, 
586–90 (2001). 
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interview.145  Of course, this process can occur during informal 
conversations before investigations as well as during investigative 
interviews. 
V. INTERIM SUMMARY 
Research has shown that children’s eyewitness accuracy is 
highly dependent on context, that neurological immaturity makes 
children vulnerable to certain errors, and that some children are 
more affected by external influences than others due to individual 
differences.  The long list of factors that can influence the 
reliability of children’s testimony brings us to the final principle: 
Principle #4.  Analyzing children’s testimony as if they 
were adults, with adult abilities, sensibilities, and 
motivations, leads to frequent misunderstandings.  It 
takes considerable knowledge of development 
(developmental psycholinguistics, memory development, 
cognitive control, etc.) to work with child witnesses and to 
analyze cases because there are many sources of 
unreliable testimony. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In medicine, law, and child protection, the knowledge 
domains that support decision-making are “ill-structured” in the 
sense that “individual cases of knowledge application are typically 
multidimensional and there is considerable variability in the 
structure and content across cases of the same nominal type.”146  
A pervasive problem in such fields is the reductive bias, which is a 
“tendency for people to treat and interpret complex circumstances 
and topics as simpler than they really are.”147  In the child witness 
field, limiting interpretation of evidence to one of two camps of 
thought about children’s testimonial reliability is an example of 
reductive thinking that does little to improve our understanding of 
 145.  Id. at 590–91. 
 146.  Rand J. Spiro, Paul J. Feltovich & Richard L. Coulson, Two 
Epistemic World-Views: Prefigurative Schemas and Learning in Complex 
Domains, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. S51 (1996). 
 147.  See id. at S52; Paul J. Feltovich, Rand J. Spiro & Richard L. 
Coulson, Issues of Expert Flexibility in Contexts Characterized by Complexity 
and Change, in EXPERTISE IN CONTEXT:  HUMAN AND MACHINE 125, 128 (Paul 
J. Feltovich, Kenneth M. Ford, & Robert R. Hoffman, eds., 1997).  
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children’s testimonial abilities. 
Individuals with a reductive worldview hold beliefs about 
knowledge and learning (i.e., epistemic beliefs) that lead them to 
view situations as having just one or a few possibilities.  They also 
view situations as being fixed in time and comprised of features, 
acting separately, that are understood in terms of universally 
applicable principles.148  Applied to child witness cases, the 
reductive view asks whether testimony is true or false, rather 
than asking which aspects of testimony are true and false; focuses 
on static time-points in a case, rather than analyzing how 
testimony developed over time; analyzes important case features 
individually, rather than recognizing interactions among case 
features; and applies information about factors that influence 
testimony similarly across cases, rather than appreciating the 
context specificity of that information.  Counterintuitively, time on 
the job does not always remedy the tendency to simplify because 
some jobs provide inadequate feedback about the accuracy of one’s 
decisions149 and, in some circumstances, decision-making through 
the lens of the reductive bias solidifies this pattern of thought.150 
The four principles of children’s testimony in this review can 
counteract reductive thinking by reminding us that testimonial 
accuracy is dependent on context at all ages, that neurological 
immaturity creates vulnerabilities that impact testimony 
differently for children of different ages and developmental 
trajectories, and that many developmental phenomena influence 
testimonial quality.  These complexities dictate the need for 
evidence-based protocols for interviewing children,151 thorough 
investigative approaches, and case analyses based on time-lines 
that track children’s reports across time and contexts.152 
 148.  Feltovich et al., supra note 147, at 134. 
 149.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux 2013). 
 150.  See Feltovich et al., supra note 147, at 136. 
 151.  See generally MICHAEL E. LAMB, IRIT HERSHKOWITZ, YAEL ORBACH, 
PHILIP W. ESPLIN, TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED:  STRUCTURED INVESTIGATIVE 
INTERVIEWS OF CHILD VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (2008).; see also, e.g.,  STATE OF 
MICHIGAN GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT & DEP’T OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, FORENSIC INTERVIEWING PROTOCOL 1–21 (3d ed. 2011). 
 152.  See generally Maggie Bruck & Steven J. Ceci, Forensic 
Developmental Psychology in the Courtroom, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 723–36 (David Faust ed., Press 6th ed. 2012). 
 
